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NOTES
QUILICI V. VILLAGE OF MORTON GROVE:
AMMUNITION FOR A NATIONAL HANDGUN BAN
Geoffrey La Gioia never expected his simple request for a business license
to result in this nation's first ban on the possession and sale of handguns.
La Gioia, a twenty-four year old resident of Morton Grove, Illinois, attended
the monthly meeting of the Morton Grove Trustees on May 11, 1981, to
request a business license for a gun shop.' La Gioia was met by a large
group of his fellow residents protesting the issuance of the business license,2
primarily on the ground that the gun shop would be located in a residential
area shopping center where junior high and high school students often
congregated.' Fearing that the thin inner walls of the shopping center would
aid criminals in stealing guns," his fellow residents believed that once a thief
had gained access to an adjoining store, a sledge hammer would provide
a quick and easy entrance to La Gioia's gun shop.' These concerns led the
Morton Grove Trustees to deny La Gioia's request.6
Trustee Neil Cashman, however, went even further and,, in a completely
unexpected move, proposed an ordinance banning the sale of handguns,'
and an additional ordinance prohibiting the possession of handguns. 8 When
the smoke cleared, the Morton Grove Trustees adopted the ordinance ban-
ning the sale of handguns by a five to one margin,' but tabled the ordinance
prohibiting handgun possession until their next meeting on June 8, 1981.10
During the next four weeks the battle lines were drawn. The Illinois State
Rifle Association circulated a flyer throughout Morton Grove encouraging
residents to come to the June 8th meeting and oppose the handgun
ordinance." The recently formed Skokie-Morton Grove Chapter of the Com-
mittee for Handgun Control staged a rally on June 7th, encouraging people
to attend the June 8th meeting and support the ordinance.' 2 The stage was
set. The entire country focused its attention on the Morton Grove Trustees'
1. Chicago Tribune, June 10, 1981, § 1, at 12, col. 1.
2. According to one account, approximately 200 people attended the May llth meeting.
Morton Grove Champion, May 14, 1981, at 3, col. 1.
3. Morton Grove Life, May 14, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
4. Id.
5. See id.
6. Id.
7. Morton Grove Life, June 1, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
8. Id.
9. Id.; see also Morton Grove News, May 14, 1981, at 3, col. 1.
10. Morton Grove Life, May 14, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
11. Morton Grove Life, May 28, 1981, at 3, col. 1.
12. Id.
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June 8th meeting,' 3 where the fate of the most restrictive gun control pro-
posal in this nation's history would be decided.' 4
Attempting to discourage nonresidents from attending, the trustees decided
to hold the June 8th meeting at the village hall rather than in a larger facility,
such as a school auditorium." Nevertheless, when the meeting convened,
the village hall meeting room was filled to capacity with approximately eighty
people.' 6 An additional crowd of 200 stood outside in a light rain listening
to the meeting over loudspeakers." As the majority of them opposed the
ordinance banning handgun possession," they were understandably distressed
when they heard over the loudspeakers that the trustees had adopted the
ordinance by a four to two margin.' In response to a resident's simple re-
quest for a business license, Morton Grove had banned both the sale and
possession of handguns.
The reaction to the adopted ordinance was widespread. Both the national,
and even international, electronic and print media devoted extensive coverage
to Morton Grove's gun control efforts.2" Within three weeks of enacting
the handgun ban, the village had received over 300 letters commenting on
the ordinance; the response was overwhelmingly favorable. 2 ' Several letters
enclosed personal checks to help defray legal costs if the ordinance was
challenged in court,22 and many letters came from state and local legislators
13. See Morton Grove Life, June 4, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
14. Although several jurisdictions had previously banned the sale of handguns, prior to
Morton Grove's ordinance, no jurisdiction had banned both the sale and possession of hand-
guns. See N.Y. Times, June 13, 1981, at 22, col. 1; see also Morton Grove Life, June 25, 1981,
at 1, col. 1; Chicago Sun-Times, June 11, 1981, at 61, col. 1; Morton Grove Champion, June
11, 1981, at 3, col.l.
15. Morton Grove Life, June 11, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
16. Morton Grove Champion, June 11, 1981, at 3, col. 1.
17. Id. Another report estimated a crowd of only 150 outside village hall. Morton Grove
Life, June 11, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
18. Morton Grove Life, June 11, 1981, at 1, col. 1. Many wore black "NRA Freedom"
T-shirts and several carried signs reading "Free Men Own Handguns-Slaves Don't" and "Mess
With My Second Amendment-I'll Mess With Your First." Id.
19. Chicago Sun-Times, June 11, 1981, at 61, col. 1; see also Morton Grove Life, June
11, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
20. The three major networks televised reports on the ordinance and distributed to their
affiliates taped reports that were broadcast around the country. Morton Grove Bugle, June
25, 1981, at 3, col. 1. The story also was carried by the nation's three major wire services
and reported by newspapers throughout the country. Id. Several major newspapers printed
editorials praising Morton Grove's actions. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 13, 1981, at 22, col.
1; Chicago Tribune, June 12, 1981, § 1, at 21, col. 1; Chicago Sun-Times, June 11, 1981,
at 61, col. 1. On the international level, the Canadian, European and Australian news media
all reported on Morton Grove's gun control efforts. See Morton Grove Bugle, June 25, 1981,
at 3, col. 1.
21. As of June 30, 1981, Morton Grove Village Hall had received 312 letters commenting
on the June 8th ordinance; 213 supported the handgun ban and 99 opposed it. Morton Grove
Bugle, July 2, 1981, at 3, col. 1. Furthermore, Citizen's Lobby, a Chicago-based polling organiza-
tion, reported that almost 74.5% of Morton Grove residents polled approved of banning the
sale of handguns, while only 48.5% approved of banning handgun possession. Morton Grove
News, June 18, 1982, at 3, col. 1.
22. Within one week of adopting its handgun ban, the Morton Grove Trustees received
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around the country requesting copies of the new ordinance.
2 3
Not all of the reaction, however, was positive. There were unsuccessful
attempts to repeal the ordinance24 and to enact legislation nullifying municipal
handgun bans." Moreover, on March 15, 1982, the town of Kennesaw,
Georgia responded to Morton Grove's law by enacting an ordinance requir-
ing the head of every household to own a firearm.26
Although the reaction to Morton Grove's ordinance was mixed, it was
never doubted that its constitutionality would eventually be tested in court. 7
Several national organizations offered financial assistance to anyone challeng-
ing the ordinance,28 while others pledged aid to Morton Grove. 9 Less than
twenty-four hours after the ordinance was adopted, Victor. Quilici, a Mor-
ton Grove resident and registered firearms owner, filed suit in an Illinois
circuit court challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance.10 Morton
Grove removed the action to federal court where it was consolidated with
two similar actions in Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove.I' The district court
six personal checks to help defray legal expenses. Morton Grove Bugle, June 25, 1981, at 3,
col. 1. They even received letters of support from a class of elementary school students in
California. Id.
23. Within two weeks of its adoption, nearly 40 requests for copies of the Morton Grove
ordinance were received from state and local legislators around the nation. Morton Grove Bugle,
June 25, 1981, at 47, col. 1.
24. See Morton Grove Champion, October 14, 1982, at 3, col. 1.
25. On June 22, 1981, a zoning bill, passed by the Illinois Senate, was amended by the
Illinois House of Representatives to preclude municipalities from regulating firearms. The bill,
as amended, ultimately was defeated on April 14, 1982, when it failed to receive the required
three-fifths vote for passage. See Legislative Synopsis and Digest of the 1982 Session of the
Eighty-Second General Assembly State of Illinois (No. 15) Vol. I, at 40 (1982).
26. Morton Grove Life, March 18, 1982, at 3, col. 1.
27. Richard Flickinger, Mayor of Morton Grove, stated: "We know we are going to court
if the legislation passes, but we think it is time to get the ball rolling on better control of
handguns." Morton Grove Champion, June 4, 1981, at 3, col. 1. Several of the Morton Grove
Trustees shared this belief. Trustee Neil Cashman, sponsor of the ordinance, maintained that
it was time to "get into court" and determine the permissible scope of municipal handgun
control. Morton Grove Life, May 28, 1981, at 1, col. 1. Another trustee, Gregg Youstra, voted
for the ordinance hoping to force the United States Supreme Court to determine whether
municipalities could constitutionally prohibit handgun possession. Morton Grove Champion,
June 11, 1981, at 3, col. 1. Furthermore, a New York Times editorial also was certain that
the ordinance would be challenged in court. See N.Y. Times, June 13, 1981, at 22, col. 1.
28. James Valentino, a representative of the Illinois Rifle Association., said that the Na-
tional Rifle Association would give financial aid to any individual who challenged the ordinance
in court. Morton Grove Champion, June 11, 1981, at 3, col. 1. Furthermore, the Second Amend-
ment Foundation contributed $2,000 to Victor Quilici's legal attack on the handgun ban. Morton
Grove Champion, June 25, 1981, at 8, col. 1.
29. The National Coalition to Ban Handguns offered to pay all of Morton Grove's costs,
except attorney fees, related to defending the constitutionality of its handgun ban. Morton
Grove Champion, June 25, 1981, at 8, col. 1. Additionally, an unnamed, prestigious Washington,
D.C., law firm reportedly offered free legal assistance to Morton Grove. Morton Grove Bugle,
June 11, 1981, at 38, col. i.
30. See Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, No. 81 CH 4439 (1st Cir. Ct. Ill. filed June
9, 1981).
31. 532 F, Supp. 1169, 1171 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
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held that the ordinance was constitutional32 and upon appeal, the Seventh
Circuit affirmed in a two to one decision.
33
A careful analysis of Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove requires a
thorough examination of the right to bear arms as guaranteed by both the
second amendment to the United States Constitution and by article I, sec-
tion 22 of the Illinois Constitution. The authority of an Illinois municipality
to enact a handgun ban also must be carefully scrutinized, as must the ques-
tion of the existence of a fundamental right under the ninth amendment
to the United States Constitution to possess a handgun for purposes of self-
defense. Finally, an analysis of Quilici would be incomplete without an assess-
ment of the decision's impact on future gun control efforts.
BACKGROUND
The Federal Right to Bear Arms
The historical foundation of the federal right to bear arms was laid in
seventeenth century England. After James II disarmed the Protestants in 1688,
Parliament enacted the English Bill of Rights which included a provision
enabling Protestants to possess arms. 34 Intending to ensure the preservation
of the Protestant religion against the King's huge standing army, comprised
principally of Catholics, 3 the provision guaranteed a collective right to bear
arms. This provision protected the right of Protestants to serve in the royal
army, but did not confer upon them an individual right to possess arms
in self-defense. 3 6 It was this collective concept of the right to bear arms that
the British colonists brought with them to America."
During the colonial period in America, the right to bear arms acquired
new importance. A primary grievance of the colonists concerned the oppres-
sion by British military rule 38 through its standing army. This army was
viewed as the greatest threat to the colonists' individual liberty. 39 Conse-
quently, each colony established a militia to protect itself against the British
32. Id. at 1184-85.
33. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 271 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
52 U.S.L.W. 3236 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1983) (No. 82-1822).
34. The provision read: "subjects which are protestants, may have arms for their defence
suitable to their conditions, and as allowed by law." Bill of Rights, I W. & M., ch. 2 (1689),
reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 246 (R. Perry ed. 1959).
35. For a general discussion of the historical events which led to the adoption of the English
right to bear arms, see Emery, The Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 28 HARV.
L. REV. 473, 474 (1915); Feller & Gotting, The Second Amendment: A Second Look, 61 Nw.
U.L. REV. 46, 48 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Feller & Gotting]; Comment, Shooting to Kill
the Handgun: Time to Martyr Another American "Hero," 51 J. URB. L. 491, 515-16 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Shooting to Kill].
36. See Feller & Gotting, supra note 35, at 48; Comment, Shooting to Kill, supra note
35, at 516.
37. Comment, Shooting to Kill, supra note 35, at 516.
38. Feller & Gotting, supra note 35, at 49. For a detailed discussion of the particular objec-
tions the colonists had to Great Britain's military rule, see id. at 49-53.
39. Id. at 49-53.
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forces."' Since the colonies generally were unable to afford to arm these
militias, colonial statutes imposed a duty on each colonist to keep and bear
arms.'
During the Revolutionary War period, many of the states framed con-
stitutions which included specific bills of rights. All of these constitutions
contained provisions reflecting the colonial fear of British standing armies."2
These provisions guaranteed the right to bear arms in an attempt to replace
colonial standing armies with popular militias and, thereby, to ensure in-
dividual liberties.4 3
When the Constitutional Convention convened in 1787, a new concern
arose regarding the right to bear arms. In addition to the historical fear
that standing armies threatened individual liberties, many of the framers were
concerned about the balance of military power between the states and the
new federal government.4" Although attempts were made to secure states'
rights to establish militias, 5 these attempts were unsuccessful because of the
countervailing necessity to establish an effective and centralized military."
During the struggle for ratification, the concern over the balance of military
power resurfaced.4 7 Although the Constitution was ratified in 1787, the issue
of state militias was not resolved until two years later.
Among the proposed constitutional amendments introduced by James
Madison to the House of Representatives on June 8, 1789, was the initial
draft of the second amendment.4 8 Madison proposed that the right to keep
40. Id. In establishing these militias, the colonists were unconcerned with guaranteeing a
personal right to possess firearms. By contrast, their goal was to protect their colonies against
the military rule of Great Britain's standing army and to protect the colonies in case Great
Britain's standing army failed to defend them if attacked. Id. at 52-53 (citing MILLER, THE
CASE FOR LIBERTY 68 (1965)).
41. Levin, The Right to Bear Arms: The Development of the American Experience, 48 CHI[-]
KENT L. REv. 148, 148-49 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Levin].
42. For an examination of these various state constitutional provisions, see Feller &.Got-
ting, supra note 35, at 53-56; Levin, supra note 41, at 152-54.
43. By replacing standing armies with popular militias, it was believed that a source of
arbitrary military power would be removed from the control of state governments. Levin, supra
note 41, at 153. Consequently, the right to bear arms, conferred by state constitutions during
the Revolutionary War period, was not intended to guarantee an individual right to possess
arms; rather, it was aimed at preserving the existence of popular militias. Id.
44. Id. at 151.
45. For a discussion of these attempts, see Feller & Gotting, supra note 35, at 56-58; Levin,
supra note 41, at 154-56.
46. Levin, supra note 41, at 155.
47. Id. at 156-58; Feller & Gotting, supra note 35, at 58-60.
48. As originally proposed, the amendment provided that "[t]he right of the people to keep
and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well-armed and well-regulated militia being the best
security of a free country; but no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be com-
pelled to render military service in person." 1 ANNALS OF CoNo. 434 (J. Gales ed. 1789). When
it was first reported out of committee, the proposal had been modified to state: "A well-
regulated Militia, composed of the body of the people, being the best security of a free state,
the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; but no person religiously
scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms." Id. at 749. When it was finally adopted by Con-
gress, the second amendment read as it does presently: "A well-regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
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and bear arms be guaranteed to the people so that the federal government
could not destroy the state militias on its own authority.' 9 The amendment
was aimed at preserving both individual liberties and states' rights by balanc-
ing military power between the federal and state governments."0 Accordingly,
the framers of the second amendment intended to guarantee a collective right
to bear arms-a right possessed by the people as a corporate body so the
state could maintain militias as a check against the prowess of the federal
standing army." Thus, the second amendment was not intended to guarantee
an individual right to bear arms except, perhaps, to individual militia
members."
On those rare occasions when the United States Supreme Court has con-
strued the second amendment, it has consistently emphasized the collective
nature of the federal right to bear arms. The first time the Court considered
the second amendment was in United States v. Cruikshank," an 1875 civil
rights case, in which the Court only indirectly touched upon the right to
bear arms."' Noting that the second amendment applies only to the federal
government, the Court found that it presents no obstacle to state firearms
regulations.5  Eleven years later, in Presser v. Illinois 6 the Court addressed
the second amendment directly for the first time. 7 Relying on Cruikshank,
the Court held that the second amendment only limits the power of Con-
gress, and not the power of the states, to regulate firearms." Nevertheless,
infringed." U.S. CONST. amend 11. For a discussion of the debates surrounding the various
drafts of the second amendment, see Feller & Gotting, supra note 35, at 61-62.
49. See Feller & Gotting, supra note 35, at 61-62; Levin, supra note 41, at 159; Comment,
Shooting to Kill, supra note 35, at 516.
50. Levin, supra note 41, at 160.
51. See id. at 159; Comment, Shooting to Kill, supra note 35, at 517. Two commentators
contend that the presence of the conscientious objector provision in early drafts indicates that
the second amendment right to bear arms was intended to protect a collective, and not an in-
dividual, right. Feller & Gotting, supra note 35, at 61.
52. But see Weiss, A Reply to Advocates of Gun-Control Law, 52 J. URB. L. 577 (1974).
Weiss contends that under the second amendment, individuals have an absolute right to possess
arms. Arguing that the second amendment was intended to secure individual liberty, Weiss
contends that it aids in the exercise of first amendment freedoms. Id. at 581-83.
53. 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (reversing a conviction for conspiracy to deprive blacks of their
constitutional rights).
54. Cruikshank involved a 16 count indictment under the Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870,
§ 6, 16 Stat. 140, 141. The government alleged a conspiracy to deprive blacks of several con-
stitutional rights; the right to bear arms was merely one of them. 92 U.S. at 548.
55. The Cruikshank Court found the second amendment to grant no individual right to
bear arms. 92 U.S. at 553. Noting that the existence of an individual's right to bear arms
does not depend on the second amendment, the Cruikshank Court declared that the amend-
ment simply precludes Congress from infringing whatever state right individuals might have
to bear arms. Id. Moreover, the Court classified the second amendment as "one of the amend-
ments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national government .... Id.
56. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
57. Presser involved the constitutionality of an Illinois statute which prohibited groups from
associating together as military organizations, or from drilling or parading with arms in cities
and towns, unless authorized to do so by law. 1d, at 253-54.
58. Id. at 265.
[Vol. 32:371
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the Presser Court noted that the states' power to regulate firearms was not
absolute.59 The Court found that all citizens capable of bearing arms con-
stitute the reserve militias of the United States and of the states individually.6"
The Presser Court, therefore, concluded that the states could not constitu-
tionally prohibit citizens from keeping and bearing arms when such prohibi-
tions inhibit the maintenance of well-regulated militias. 6'
After Presser, more than fifty years passed before the Court again fo-
cused its attention on the second amendment. 6 At issue in United States
v. Miller63 was the constitutionality of the National Firearms Act," a scheme
of congressional firearms regulations. In addition to reaffirming the collec-
tive right concept, the Miller Court established a standard to determine the
extent to which arms could be constitutionally regulated. The Miller Court
held that the second amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear only
those arms which have "some reasonable relationship to the preservation
or efficiency of a well-regulated militia.'"6
Miller represents the last time in which the Supreme Court considered the
second amendment. Several lower federal courts, however, have since com-
mented on the federal right to bear arms." For example, in Cases v. United
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. Noting that the appellant in Presser was not a member of an organized state militia,
the Court concluded that the challenged statute did not prevent the maintenance of a well-
regulated militia. Id. at 266. Based upon this reasoning, it appears that if the appellant was
a militia member he would have had an individual right to possess arms. Cf. Levin, supra
note 41, at 165; Comment, Shooting to Kill, supra note 35, at 518.
62. In 1894, the Court indirectly considered the second amendment. In Miller v. Texas,
153 U.S. 535 (1894), the Court dismissed an appeal from a state court of last resort for failure
to raise a federal question prior to appeal. In his motion for rehearing, Miller claimed that
his conviction under a Texas statute, prohibiting the carrying of weapons, violated the second
amendment. Id. at 538. Although the Court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that it was
not properly presented on the record, the Court reaffirmed Cruikshank and Presser by declar-
ing that the restrictions imposed by the second amendment operate only on the federal govern-
ment. Id. (dictum); see also Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897) (recognizing, in dicta,
that the second amendment is not violated by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons).
63. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
64. National Firearms Act, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (current version at 26 U.S.C.
§§ 5801-5872 (1976)). The defendant in United States v. Miller was indicted for violating a provi-
sion of this act which regulated the interstate transportation of shotguns with barrels less than
18 inches long. The district court, however, sustained the defendant's demurrer on the grounds
that this provision violated the second amendment. United States v. Miller, 26 F. Supp. 1002,
1003 (W.D. Ark. 1939). In reversing the district court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed
the collective right concept by recognizing that the purpose of the second amendment was to
assure the preservation of well-regulated militias. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
65. 307 U.S. at 178. The Miller Court concluded that sawed-off shotguns failed to meet
this reasonable relationship requirement and, therefore, are outside the scope of the second
amendment protection. Id.
66. Most of these decisions involved challenges to federal firearms regulations. In 1934,
Congress enacted the National Firearms Act, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 ('1934) (current version
at 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872 (1976)). Among other things, the Act required the registration of
certain firearms, such as sawed-off shotguns and machine guns. Lower federal courts have
consistently upheld the constitutionality of this requirement when challenged on second amend-
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States,67 decided only three years after Miller, the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit criticized the Miller holding and found that it applied only to
the facts presented therein.6 8 Concluding that the extent to which the second
ment grounds. See, e.g., United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 948 (1976); United States v. Birmley, 529 F.2d 103, 107 (6th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Williams, 446 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. McCutcheon, 446 F.2d 133,
135-36 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Casson, 288 F. Supp. 86, 88 (D. Del. 1968); United
States v. Adams, 11 F. Supp. 216, 219 (S.D. Fla. 1935).
In 1938, Congress enacted another statute regulating firearms, the Federal Firearms Act,
ch. 850, 52 Stat. 1250 (1938), amended by Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, PuB. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 226-35 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928
(1976)). This act prohibited, among other things, the possession of firearms by persons previously
convicted of a felony. The constitutionality of this prohibition also has been consistently upheld
under second amendment challenges. See, e.g., United States v. Turcotte, 558 F.2d 893, 895
(8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir. 1974); Cody v. United
States, 460 F.2d 34, 36-37 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1010 (1972); United States v. Lauchli,
444 F.2d 1037, 1041 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 868 (1972); United States v. Tot,
131 F.2d 261, 266-67 (3d Cir. 1942), aff'g, 42 F. Supp. 252 (D.N.J. 1941), rev'd on other
grounds, 319 U.S. 463 (1943); United States v. Kozerski, 518 F. Supp. 1082, 1090 (D.N.H.
1981); United States v. Tot, 28 F. Supp. 900, 903 (D.N.J. 1939).
The possession of firearms by previously convicted felons is also prohibited under the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 236-37, 18 U.S.C.
app. §§ 1201-1203 (1976). The constitutionality of this act has been similarly upheld on second
amendment grounds. See, e.g., Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Synnes, 438 F.2d 764, 772 (8th Cir. 1971), vacated on other grounds, 404
U.S. 1009 (1972); United States v. Three Winchester 30-30 Caliber Lever Action Carbines, 363
F. Supp. 322, 323 (E.D. Wis. 1973), aff'd, 504 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Wiley, 309 F. Supp. 141, 144-45 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd, 438 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1971). The
constitutionality of a federal statute prohibiting any person, other than a licensed dealer, from
engaging in the business of dealing in firearms has also been upheld. See United States v.
Gross, 313 F. Supp. 1330, 1334 (S.D. Ind. 1970) (declaring that required licensing of firearms
dealers does not impair the efficiency of a well-regulated militia), aff'd, 451 F.2d 1355 (7th
Cir. 1971). Similarly, the constitutionality of a federal statute regulating the exportation of
certain ammunition has been sustained. See United States v. Gurrola-Garcia, 547 F.2d 1075,
1079 (9th Cir. 1976) (noting that the second amendment does not protect efforts to export
munitions). Moreover, in Eckert v. City of Philadelphia, 329 F. Supp. 845 (E.D. Pa. 1971),
aff'd, 477 F.2d 610 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 839 (1973), a district court upheld
the constitutionality of a city ordinance which regulated the purchase and transfer of firearms.
The Eckert court held that the federal right to bear arms is not conferred on the people; the
sole function of the second amendment is to limit the power of the federal government. 329
F. Supp. at 845.
67. 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied sub nom. Velasquez v. United States, 319
U.S. 770 (1943). In Cases, the First Circuit examined the constitutionality of the Federal Firearms
Act, another scheme of congressional firearms regulation. See Federal Firearms Act, ch. 850,
52 Stat. 1250 (1938) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1976)). The Cases court held
that the second amendment conferred no right to bear arms upon the people; its only function
was to prevent the federal government from infringing upon any individual right to bear arms
conferred by "local legislation." 131 F.2d at 921.
68. The Cases court read the United States v. Miller standard to permit federal prohibitions
of the possession of any weapon not reasonably related to militia preservation. 131 F.2d at
922. The court noted that if this standard was intended to have general applicability, it was
already obsolete (despite being formulated less than four years prior to Cases), because almost
all modern lethal weapons have "some sort of military use." Id. Thus, the Cases court con-
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amendment limits the federal government must be determined on a case-by-
case basis, 9 the Cases court declared that federal regulations violate the sec-
ond amendment only when they actually inhibit the efficiency of a well-
regulated militia. 0 Other lower federal courts have consistently adhered to
Presser and its progeny by concluding that the second amendment poses no
barrier to state firearms regulations. 7' Following Miller, these lower courts
have confirmed that the federal right to bear arms embodies a collective,
rather than an individual, right. The second amendment, however, is not
the sole protector of the right to bear arms. Most state constitutions also
have provisions which secure this right.
The Illinois Constitutional Right to Bear Arms
Because the second amendment applies only to the federal government
and confers no individual right to bear arms, many state constitutions
guarantee this right to their citizens. Some constitutions follow the second
amendment by securing only a collective right;72 others protect the individual's
right to bear arms. 3 Several confer the individual right, but subject it to
varying degrees of the state's police power," while a number of state con-
stitutions fail to provide any right whatsoever to bear arms.7"
cluded that if the Miller standard had general applicability, the federal government could only
prohibit the possession of such weapons as a "flintlock musket or a matchlock harquebus
. . . [because] almost any other [weapon] might bear some reasonable relationship to the preser-
vation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia unit of the present day .. " Id. Consequently,
the Cases court limited the standard announced in Miller to the facts in that case.
69. Id. The Cases court stated that the existence of many variables made it impossible to
formulate any general test for determining the limitations imposed by the second amendment. Id.
70. Based on the facts presented in Cases, the court found no evidence that the defendant
had ever been a militia member, or possessed firearms in preparation for a military career.
Id. at 923. Although the court noted that the defendant's firearm was capable of military use,
the defendant had no "intention of contributing to the efficiency of the well-regulated militia
which the Second Amendment was designed to foster as necessary to the security of a free
state." Id. Hence, the court concluded that the federal regulation, as applied to the facts
presented, did not violate the second amendment. Id.
71. See supra note 66.
72. See ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 19; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 5; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8;
GA. CONST. art. I, § 1; HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 15; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 11; IND. CONST.
art. 1, § 32; KAN. BILL OF RIGHTS, § 4; Ky. BILL OF RIGHTS, § 1, para. 7; MASS. DECLARATION
OF RiGwrs, pt. I, art. XVII; N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 30; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 4; OR. CONST.
art 1, § 27; PA. CONST. art. I, § 21; R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 22; S.C. CONsT. art. I, § 20; S.D.
CONST. art. VI, § 24; TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 26; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 6; VT. CONST. ch.
I, art. 16; VA. CONST. art. I, § 13; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 24.
73. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 26; ARIZ. CONST. art. II § 26; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 13;
CONN. CONST. art. I, § 15; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 22; LA. CONST. art 1, § 11; ME. CONST.
art. I, § 16; MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 6; MIsS. CONST. art. III, § 12; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 23;
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 12; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 6; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 26; TEX.
CONST. art. 1, § 23; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 24.
74. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8; GA. CONST. art I, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 22; UTAH
CONST. art. I, § 6.
75. Presently only 13 state constitutions lack provisions guaranteeing a right to bear arms.
These states are California, Delaware, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Nevada, North Dakota, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
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Under the Illinois state constitution in effect prior to 1970, Illinois citizens
possessed the right to bear arms only to the extent that the right was
guaranteed by the second amendment.76 Accordingly, the Illinois Supreme
Court upheld an ordinance requiring the licensing of concealable weapons
dealers," a statute prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons,78 and
ordinances regulating the possession of and requiring the registration of
firearms.79 In so doing, the Illinois Supreme Court relied on the premise
that a "regulation which does not impair the maintenance of the State's
active, organized militia is not in violation of ... the second amendment." 8
Thus, prior to 1970, the right of Illinois citizens to bear arms was essen-
tially coextensive with the right preserved by the second amendment.
In 1970, however, Illinois ratified a new constitution which specifically
contained a right to bear arms provision. Article I, section 22 states: "Sub-
ject only to the police power, the right of the individual citizen to keep
and bear arms shall not be infringed."" The extent to which section 22 alters
the second amendment right of Illinois citizens to bear arms has yet to be
examined by the Illinois Supreme Court. Four Illinois appellate court deci-
sions,* however, have shed some light on this question.
In both People v. Graves82 and People v. Wilkes,83 the Illinois appellate
court for the First District upheld a statute which prohibited the possession
of loaded firearms under certain circumstances.8 The Wilkes court noted
that under section 22, the state retains its power to control crime by impos-
ing restrictions on the right to carry or possess arms.8" In People v.
Williams,8" the First District again upheld the constitutionality of this statute.
76. Illinois constitutions prior to 1970 guaranteed no state right to bear arms.
77. Biffer v. City of Chicago, 278 Ill. 562, 116 N.E. 182 (1917) (ordinance declared to
be a valid exercise of the city's police power, and pursuant to their police power, municipalities
are free to regulate or prohibit the sale or advertising of deadly weapons without violating
the second amendment).
78. People v. Saltis, 328 IlI. 494, 160 N.E. 86 (1927) (holding statute to be a valid exercise
of the state's police power); cf. People v. Liss, 406 Ill. 419, 424, 94 N.E.2d 320, 323 (1950)
(reversing conviction for carrying a concealed weapon where individual had no knowledge of
weapon's presence).
79. Brown v. City of Chicago, 42 Il. 2d 501, 250 N.E.2d 129 (1969) (ordinances found
to be valid exercises of the city's police powers and not violative of the second amendment
since they did not impair maintenance of state's militia).
80. Id. at 504, 250 N.E.2d at 131 (emphasis added).
81. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 22.
* Subsequent to submission of this Note for publication, the Illinois appellate court in
Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 113 Ill. App. 3d 448, 447 N.E.2d 849 (1st Dist. 1983)
(petition for leave to appeal filed June 2, 1983), adopted the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in
Quilici and upheld Morton Grove's handgun ban.-Ed.
82. 23 I1l. App. 3d 762, 320 N.E.2d 95 (1st Dist. 1974).
83. 31 I1. App. 3d 902, 334 N.E.2d 910 (1st Dist. 1975).
84. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 24-1(a)(10) (1973). This statute did not apply to the posses-
sion of such weapons within one's home or fixed place of business. Id.
85. 31 I1. App. 3d at 905, 334 N.E.2d at 912.
86. 60 I1. App. 3d 726, 377 N.E.2d 285 (1st Dist. 1978).
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The Williams court relied on a 1902 decision of the Idaho Supreme Court87
to distinguish between the constitutional regulation and the unconstitutional
prohibition of firearms." According great weight to the numerous exceptions
contained within the statute, the Williams court concluded that it was mere-
ly a regulation and not a prohibition; therefore, the statute was a valid ex-
ercise of the state's police power and did not violate section 22.89
The most recent construction of section 22 occurred in Rawlings v. Depart-
ment of Law Enforcement,9" a case involving the constitutionality of a statute
that conditioned legal possession of a firearm on obtaining a firearm owner's
identification card. 9' In Rawlings, the appellate court for the Third District
determined that the identification card requirement was a reasonable exer-
cise of the state's police power enacted pursuant to section 22.92 The court
noted that although section 22 "grants to the individual the right to keep
and bear arms . . . infringement is expressly allowed in the exercise of the
police power." 93 Therefore, the Rawlings court held the statute valid under
both section 22 and the second amendment."'
In view of the construction given to section 22 by these appellate deci-
sions, it appears that the right of Illinois citizens to bear arms was broad-
ened under the ratified 1970 state constitution. Under the second amend-
ment, Illinois citizens possess only a collective right to bear arms, reasonably
related to the preservation of a well-regulated militia. Under section 22,
however, Illinois citizens possess an individual right to bear arms which is
87. In re Brickley, 8 Idaho 597, 70 P. 609 (1902) (statute prohibiting the carrying of con-
cealed deadly weapons within city limits held to violate federal and state constitutional rights
to bear arms).
88. Under this distinction, statutory prohibition of firearm possession would be unconstitu-
tional, while mere statutory regulation of such possession would not be. Williams, 60 Ill. App.
3d at 728, 377 N.E.2d at 286.
89. Id. at 728, 377 N.E.2d at 287. Among the various exceptions were those for individual
possession in one's home or place of business and for hunters and fishermen engaged in their
pursuits. Id. at 727, 377 N.E.2d at 286.
90. 73 II1. App. 3d 267, 391 N.E.2d 758 (3d Dist. 1979).
91. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 83-2 (1977). The plaintiff in Rawlings was denied an
identification card because she had voluntarily committed herself to a mental hospital for a
period of 10 days. The Illinois Department of Law Enforcement, acting pursuant to statutory
authority, denied the plaintiff's request for an identification card on the grounds that she had
been a patient in a mental institution within five years of applying for the identification card.
See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 83-4, 83-8 (1977).
92. 73 IlI. App. 3d at 274, 391 N.E.2d at 762-63.
93. Id. at 274, 391 N.E.2d at 763. To support this conclusion, the Rawlings court quoted
a portion of the official commentary accompanying § 22, which indicates that the framers
did not intend for § 22 to invalidate licensing and registration requirements or prohibit the
carrying of concealed weapons. Id. at 275, 391 N.E.2d at 763; see also ILL. ANN. STAT. CONST.
of 1970, art. 1, § 22 (Smith-Hurd 1971).
94. Relying on United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), and Brown v. Chicago, 42
Ill. 2d 501, 250 N.E.2d 120 (1969), the Rawlings court found the second amendment right
to bear arms limited to those arms which were reasonably related to militia preservation. 73
Ill. App. 3d at 274, 391 N.E.2d at 763. Furthermore, the court noted that the right of an
individual to own or possess firearms is not protected by the federal constitution. Id.
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wholly unrelated to militia preservation. Nevertheless, the right secured by
section 22 has been held to be a conditional right, expressly subject to the
police power. Whether Morton Grove's ordinance banning the possession
of handguns falls within the purview of this police power is the central issue
presented in Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove.
THE QuiLici DECISION
Plaintiffs alleged that Morton Grove's handgun ban95 violated article I,
section 22 of the Illinois Constitution and the second, ninth and fourteenth
amendments of the United States Constitution.96 Their arguments rested on
the grounds that both the second amendment, applicable to Morton Grove
through the fourteenth amendment, and section 22 guarantee an individual
right to possess handguns, that the ninth amendment ensures a fundamen-
tal right to possess handguns for purposes of self-defense, 8 and that Mor-
ton Grove lacked the authority to enact firearms regulations.9 The district
court held that the ordinance was a valid exercise of Morton Grove's police
power and, therefore, it did not violate section 22.'°0 In a decision authored
by Judge Bauer and joined by Judge Wood, the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's ruling over Judge Coffey's dissent.
Initially, the Seventh Circuit examined the constitutionality of Morton
Grove's handgun ban under section 22. The court determined that although
individual handgun possession is protected by section 22,11' such protection
is so limited by the police power that a handgun ban fails to violate section
22's right to bear arms.102 Relying heavily on the constitutional history of
section 22, the court reasoned that the Illinois right to bear arms only pro-
95. Morton Grove's ordinance banning the possession of handguns is reprinted in Quilici,
695 F.2d at 263-64.
96. Id. at 264-65.
97. Id. at 266, 269.
98. Id. at 271.
99. Id. at 267-68. The plaintiffs sought to have the ordinance declared unconstitutional
and its enforcement permanently enjoined. Id. at 265. Upon filing cross-motions for summary
judgment, the district court granted Morton Grove's motion and denied plaintiff's motion. Id.
100. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 532 F. Supp. 1169, 1179 (N.D. I1. 1981). The
district court further held that the second amendment was inapplicable to Morton Grove's or-
dinance, and that no right to possess handguns was guaranteed by the ninth amendment. Id.
at 1182-83. Accordingly, the district court upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and
the Seventh Circuit granted review.
101. 695 F.2d at 266-67. Relying on the constitutional history of § 22, the court noted:
The [constitutional] debates indicate that the category of arms protected by section
22 is not limited to military weapons; the framers also intended to include those
arms that "law-abiding persons commonly employ[ed]" for "recreation or the pro-
tection of person and property." Handguns are undisputedly the type of arms com-
monly used for "recreation or the protection of person and property."
Id. at 266 (citations omitted).
102. Id. at 267. In reaching this conclusion the court found it significant that the terms
of § 22 grant the right to keep and bear "arms"-not handguns. Id. Furthermore, the Quilici
majority noted that the framers of § 22 contemplated the existence of municipal handgun bans. Id.
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hibits a complete ban of all arms.' °3 Accordingly, the Quilici court found
that section 22 permits bans on certain categories of guns, such as handguns,
even though such weapons are within the conditional protection of section
22's right to bear arms.'"" The Quilici majority then concluded that Morton
Grove, under its home rule authority, had the power to enact the ordinance
pursuant to its police power under section 22. '05
Next, the Quilici court considered the second amendment issue. Relying
on Presser v. Illinois,'16 the Seventh Circuit held that the second amend-
ment applies only to the federal government and, therefore, poses no obstacle
to Morton Grove's ordinance.' 0 ' The Quilici majority noted that Presser is
still good law, despite having been decided ninety-six years ago.' 00 Although
the court determined that the second amendment was inapplicable, the
majority briefly commented on the scope of its protection. Relying on United
States v. Miller,'"9 the Quilici court concluded that "the right to bear arms
is inextricably connected to the preservation of a militia."' Therefore, the
court found that the second amendment guarantees no individual right to
possess handguns."' For the foregoing reasons, the Quilici court held that
Morton Grove's ordinance does not violate the second amendment." '
103. Id. at 267-68.
104. Id. at 268.
105. Id. at 267-69. The majority's entire home rule analysis consisted of this statement:
Home rule government is based on the theory that local governments are in the
best position to assess the needs and desires of the community and, thus, can most
wisely enact legislation addressing local concerns. Illinois home rule units have ex-
pansive powers to govern as they deem proper, including the authority to impose
greater restrictions on particular rights than those imposed by the states. The only
limits on their autonomy are those imposed by the Illinois Constituion or by the
Illinois General Assembly exercising its authority to preempt home rule in specific
instances.
Id. at 267-68 (citations & footnotes omitted).
106. 116 U.S. 252 (1886). For a discussion of Presser, see supra notes 56-61 and accompany-
ing text.
107. 695 F.2d at 270.
108. Id. The Quilici court noted that "the Supreme Court continues to cite to Presser...
it is the law of the land and we are bound by it." Id. The court further noted that the "Supreme
Court has specifically rejected the proposition that the entire Bill of Rights applies to the states
through the fourteenth amendment." Id. (citing Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947),
overruled on other grounds, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1937); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908)).
109. 307 U.S. 174 (1939). For a discussion of Miller, see supra notes 63-65 and accompany-
ing text.
110. Quilici, 695 F.2d at 270. The Quilici court stated:
Construing Ithe second amendment's] language according to its plain meaning, it
seems clear that the right to bear arms is inextricably connected to the preservation
of militia. This is precisely the manner in which the Supreme Court interpreted
the second amendment in United States v. Miller, the only Supreme Court case
specifically addressing that amendment's scope.
Id. (citations omitted).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 271.
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Finally, the Quilici court considered the ninth amendment, and concluded
that it does not protect an individual's right to own or possess firearms for
self-defense.'' 3 Essentially, the Quilici majority held that because the United
States Supreme Court has failed to recognize such a right, that right does
not exist.' Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's decision
and upheld the- constitutionality of Morton Grove's ordinance.",
ANALYSIS AND CRITICIsM
The Quilici court's analysis is legitimate as far as it goes; the problem
is that it fails to go far enough. The Quilici majority adequately examines
the claims involving the right to bear arms, as guaranteed by the second
amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of
the Illinois Constitution. In fact, the court unnecessarily analyzes the scope
of the inapplicable second amendment. The central question the Quilici court
should have addressed is whether Morton Grove possessed the authority,
under the Illinois home rule, to enact its handgun ban. The court also dismis-
sed the ninth amendment without sufficient analysis. Thus, although the
Quilici decision is essentially valid, its analytical scope is too narrow.
The Second Amendment
The Quilici court correctly analyzed both the applicability and the scope
of the second amendment. Although second amendment decisions are scarce,
they uniformly agree that the federal right to bear arms applies only to the
federal government and not to the states.'' 6 Furthermore, because the
Supreme Court has never reconsidered Presser v. Illinois," ' it survives as
the Court's most recent pronouncement on the applicability of the second
amendment to the states."' This position is also consistent with the legislative
history surrounding the second amendment." 9 Additionally, the Court
repeatedly has rejected the proposition that the entire Bill of Rights has been
implicitly incorporated to apply to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.' Thus, the Quilici court correctly held that the second amend-
ment presents no barrier to Morton Grove's handgun ban.
113. Id.
114. Id. The Quilici court reasoned that although the "[aippellants may believe [that] the
ninth amendment should be read to recognize an unwritten, fundamental, individual right to
own or possess firearms; the fact remains that the Supreme Court has never embraced this
theory." Id. (footnote omitted).
115. Id.
116. See supra notes 53-71 and accompanying text.
117. 116 U.S. 252 (1886). For a discussion of Presser, see supra notes 56-61 and accompany-
ing text.
118. Quilici, 532 F. Supp. at 1181; see also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (1964)
(citing Presser with approval).
119. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
120. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 52-53 (1947), overruled on other grounds,
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); see also L. TRE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIoNAL LAW 567-69
(1978) (discussing the Court's selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights). The concept of
[Vol. 32:371
1983] QUILICI v. VILLAGE OF MORTON GROVE 385
Having found the second amendment to be inapplicable, it was unnecessary
for the Quilici court to consider the scope of the amendment's right to bear
arms. Nevertheless, the majority offered its opinion on the scope of the
second amendment right.'"' Once again, the court's analysis, although
superfluous, was correct. The historical development of the right to bear
arms,' 22 as well as the legislative history'23 and language of the second
amendment, 2' all support the conclusion that the federal right to bear arms
"is inextricably connected to the preservation of a militia.""' This conclu-
sion also is supported by United States v. Miller,'2 the only Supreme Court
decision to specifically examine the scope of the federal right to bear arms.'27
Consequently, the second amendment right to bear arms is properly con-
strued as a collective right, guaranteeing no individual right to possess arms.'28
The Quilici court, therefore, correctly concluded that the second amendment
guarantees no individual right to keep and bear handguns.
The State Right to Bear Arms
The Quilici court was also correct in concluding that article I, section 22
of the Illinois Constitution does not forbid the prohibition of handgun posses-
sion. Section 22, unlike the second amendment, clearly protects an individual
right; section 22 concerns "the right of the individual citizen to keep and
bear arms,' 29 and makes no reference to preserving a well-regulated militia.'30
implicit incorporation is further refuted by the reluctance of courts to apply other provisions
of the Bill of Rights to the states. See, e.g., Watson v. Jago, 558 F.2d 330 (6th Cir. 1977)
(holding that the fifth amendment right to indictment by a grand jury does not apply to the
states). But cf. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (5-4 decision) (Black, J., dissenting)
(advocating that the entire Bill of Rights should be incorporated to apply to the states).
121. The Quilici court analyzed the scope of the second amendment "[for the sake of com-
pleteness . . . and because [the] appellants devote[d] a large portion of their briefs to this
issue .. " Quilici, 695 F.2d at 270. Consequently, this entire analysis is merely dicta. Never-
theless, one court's dicta, especially when highly persuasive and well-reasoned, often emerges
subsequently as another court's ratio decidendi. History has demonstrated the significant effect
dicta often has on future constitutional analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that a higher level of judicial scrutiny may be
appropriate when regulations adversely affect "discrete and insular minorities"). Therefore,
it would be unwise to discount the effect of the Quilici court's analysis of the second amend-
ment's scope merely because it is dicta.
122. See supra notes 34-47 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
124. "A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of
the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CoNsT. amend. If (emphasis
added).
125. Quilici, 695 F.2d at 270.
126. 307 U.S. 174 (1939). For a discussion of Miller, see supra notes 63-65 and accompany-
ing text.
127. Quilici, 695 F.2d at 270.
128. See supra notes 34-71 and accompanying text.
129. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 22 (emphasis added).
130. The majority report of the Illinois constitutional convention's Bill of Rights Committee
makes it clear that § 22 was intended to guarantee an individual right to bear arms, rather
than a collective right to possess only those weapons related to militia preservation. See 6 RECORD
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Furthermore, the constitutional history of section 22 indicates that handgun
possession was intended to be within the scope of its protection.' 3 ' Thus,
the majority correctly analyzed section 22 in terms of the individual's right
to possess handguns. Nevertheless, as previously noted, section 22's right
to keep and bear arms is a conditional right subject to the police power.
Both the majority report of the Illinois constitutional convention's Bill of
Rights Committee, and the convention debates, indicate that this police power
was intended to be very broad.' 32 The framers intended this power to extend
up to, but not to include, a total prohibition of all firearms.' Therefore,
a prohibition of a certain type of firearm, such as handguns, would not
offend the framers' intent.' 34 Consequently, the Quilici court correctly con-
cluded that the scope of section 22 police power encompasses handgun bans.
The Quilici court was similarly correct in concluding that section 22 police
power could be exercised by local government units. The constitutional history
of section 22 provides conclusive support for local exercise of section 22
police power. As originally proposed in the majority report of the Illinois
constitutional convention's Bill of Rights Committee, the right to keep and
bear arms was subject to "the police powers of the State.""'3 Despite
OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 87 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
PROCEEDINGS].
131. The majority report of the Illinois constitutional convention's Bill of Rights Committee
indicates that the "substance of the right [to keep and bear arms] is that a citizen has the
right to possess and make reasonable use of arms that law-abiding persons commonly employ
for purposes of recreation or the protection of person and property." Id. Handguns are
undeniably a type of arms commonly employed for recreational and protective purposes. Addi-
tional support for this conclusion is found in the cases cited by the majority report to clarify
the scope of the term "arms." See People v. Brown, 253 Mich. 537, 541-42, 235 N.W. 245,
246-47 (1931) (limiting the state police power under a state constitutional provision protecting
the right to bear arms to the prohibition of arms not commonly used for self-protection); State
v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455, 458 (1875) (construing the state constitutional right to bear arms as
including commonly possessed weapons which are appropriate for self-defense); see also State
v. Kerner, 181 N.C. 574, 576-77, 107 S.E. 222, 224-25 (1921) (declaring pistols to fall within
the meaning of arms as used in a state constitutional provision).
132. The majority report notes that because arms pose an extraordinary threat to public
safety, their possession must be subject to an extraordinary degree of control under the police
power. 6 PROCEEDIN ,S 88. The debates indicate that the only limitation on the police power
is that some right to bear arms must remain. See 3 id. at 1688 (remarks of Delegate Foster).
133. The majority report of the Illinois constitutional convention's Bill of Rights Committee
enumerated five examples, not intended to be exclusive, of what the framers foresaw as con-
stitutional gun control under § 22. See 6 id. at 89-90. The report also noted that laws attempt-
ing to ban all possession of arms would be invalid. Id. at 87. The debates also indicated that
the framers intended § 22 simply to restrict the state's power to impose an absolute ban on
all firearms. See 3 id. at 1688, 1693, 1718; see also Comment, The Impact of State Constitu-
tional Right to Bear Arms Provisions on State Gun Control Legislation,. 38 U. CHI. L. REV.
185, 202 (1970) (interpreting § 22 to forbid only prohibitions of all arms) [hereinafter cited
as Comment, State Constitutional Right to Bear Arms].
134. Numerous statements made during the debates support this position. It was noted that
§ 22 would prevent a complete ban on all guns but allow bans on certain categories of firearms.
3 PROCEEDINGS 1687, 1693. Moreover, the framers expressly stated that handgun bans would
not violate § 22. Id. at 1687, 1689, 1718.
135. 6 id. at 84 (emphasis added).
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assurances in the majority report that this police power included exercises
of "police power by cities and villages or other instrumentalities of govern-
ment to whom state power has been validly delegated," 3 ' the framers feared
that the term "of the state" might subsequently be interpreted to preclude
municipal gun control efforts.'37 Therefore, by a voice vote,, they amended
the provision by deleting the term "of the state."' 38 Accordingly, the framers
of the Illinois Constitution left little doubt that section 2:2 police power
extends to municipalities as well as to the state legislature. Hence, the Quilici
majority correctly determined that section 22 presents no obstacle to municipal
handgun bans.
Home Rule Authority
After determining that neither the second amendment nor section 22 bars
a municipality from banning handguns, the Quilici court concluded, in a
cursory manner, that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power under
Morton Grove's home rule authority. In so doing, however, the majority
failed to adequately consider several aspects of home rule authority as it
exists under the Illinois Constitution. Although the Quilici majority correctly
analyzed the scope of police powers possessed by Illinois home rule units,
it failed to consider whether the ordinance is within the purview of Morton
Grove's local affairs, concurrent with related state legislation, or preempted
by existing statutory regulation.
Under the Illinois Constitution, a home rule unit's police power is
equivalent to the state's police power unless it has been restricted by the
constitution or by the legislature expressly acting pursuant to constitutional
authority.' 3 Furthermore, pursuant to article VII, section 6(m) of the Illinois
Constitution, courts have liberally construed home rule powers,1 0 which the
constitution left purposely broad and without specific definition. '' For ex-
ample, article VII, section 6(a) of the Illinois Constitution expressly pro-
vides that "a home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any func-
tion pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited to,
136. Id. at 91-92.
137. See 3 id. at 1687-88, 1702.
138. Id. at 1702-03.
139. See City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 85 11. 2d 101, 115, 421 N.E.2d [96, 198-99 (1981).
Except as limited by other sections of the constitution, or by the General Assembly pursuant
to constitutional authority, an Illinois home rule unit is free to govern itself. Id.; see also
City of Urbana v. Houser, 67 IlI. 2d 268, 273, 367 N.E.2d 692, 694 (1977); S. COLE, HOME
RULE HANDBOOK FOR ILLINOIS LOCAL OFFICIALS 8 (1975) [hereinafter cited as COLE].
140. ILL. CONST. art. VII. § 6(m); see also S. Bloom, Inc. v. Korshak, 52 Ill. 2d 56, 59,
284 N.E.2d 257, 260 (1972).
141. See City of Carbondale ex rel. Ham v. Eckert, 76 111. App. 3d 881, 888-89, 395 N.E.2d
607, 612 (5th Dist. 1979). Several commentators have noted that Illinois municipalities may
have the broadest powers of any home rule units in the nation. See Parkhurst, Two Years
Later: The Status of Home Rule in Illinois, in HoMEi RULE IN ILLINOIS: FINAL REPORT,
BACKGROUND PAPERS AND SPEECHES, ASSEMBLY ON HOME RULE IN ILLINOIS 22 (S. Cole & S.
Grove eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Parkhurst]; see also Baum, A Tentative Survey of Il-
linois Home Rule (Part I): Powers and Limitations, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 137, 141.
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the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals
and welfare . .. " 2 Although this provision is a broad grant of power,
the phrase "pertaining to its government and affairs" seems to limit home
rule authority to matters of local, as opposed to statewide concern. Conse-
quently, the validity of Morton Grove's handgun ban depends upon whether
firearm regulation is within the local affairs of a home rule unit.
The constitutional history of section 22 demonstrates that its framers con-
templated the existence of local handgun control." 3 Additionally, unlike other
areas of regulation, handgun control has not been recognized by the Illinois
Supreme Court as requiring a unified system of statewide regulation.", More
importantly, prior to the adoption of the 1970 constitution, the Illinois
Supreme Court repeatedly had recognized that firearms regulation was within
the scope of municipal police powers."4 5 Because the scope of Illinois home
rule police power exceeds that of municipal police power, it appears that
firearms regulation is within the purview of home rule authority.14 6 It is il-
logical to suggest, therefore, that firearms regulation in Illinois is exclusively
142. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a) (emphasis added).
143. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
144. In City of Des Plaines v. Chicago & N.W.R.R., 65 Ill. 2d 1, 7, 357 N.E.2d 433, 436
(1976), the Illinois Supreme Court recognized that regulation of regional or statewide environmen-
tal problems requires a "unified statewide program" and, therefore, is beyond the authority
of home rule units. Similarly, in Ampersand, Inc. v. Finley, 61 111. 2d 537, 542, 338 N.E.2d
15, 18-19 (1975), the Illinois Supreme Court recognized that regulation of the state judicial
system is a matter of statewide concern and consequently, outside the scope of home rule
authority.
145. See Brown v. City of Chicago, 42 IIU. 2d 501, 250 N.E.2d 129 (1969) (upholding Chicago
ordinances regulating possession, and requiring registration of firearms); Biffer v. City of Chicago,
278 Ill. 562, 116 N.E. 182 (1917) (Chicago ordinance requiring dealers of concealable weapons
to be licensed declared valid); see also City of Chicago v. Franklin, 126 I1l. App. 2d 43, 261
N.E.2d 506 (1st Dist. 1970) (Chicago ordinance requiring registration of firearms upheld).
146. Prior to 1970, Illinois municipalities had only those police powers expressly granted,
or necessarily implied, by statute. Village of Westville v. Rainwater, 294 111. 409, 128 N.E.
492 (1920) (city lacked power to require licensing of soft drink wholesalers); Clark Teachers'
Agency v. City of Chicago, 220 Ill. App. 319 (1st Dist. 1920) (city lacked power to require
licensing of private employment agencies); Hotelling v. City of Chicago, 66 Ill. App. 289 (1st
Dist. 1896) (city lacked power to require separate licenses for each type of article sold in second-
hand stores). The municipal police power was limited to those enactments aimed at preserving
the public health, morals, safety, or welfare. Hannilin Corp. v. City of Berwyn, 1 I11. 2d 28,
35, 115 N.E.2d 315, 319 (1953); Schneider v. Board of Appeals, 402 Ill. 536, 542, 84
N.E. 2d 428, 432 (1949). Furthermore, municipalities could exercise their police powers con-
currently with the state, provided that their ordinances were not inconsistent with existing statutes.
Kizer v. City of Mattoon, 332 I11. 545, 164 N.E. 20 (1928) (ordinance regulating petroleum
held invalid); City of Clinton v. Wilson, 257 Ill. 580, 101 N.E. 192 (1913) (ordinance requiring
"places of amusement" to be closed on Sunday declared invalid). Thus, ordinances which directly
or indirectly prohibited acts permitted by statute were invalid. City of Chicago v. Jenson, 331
I1. 129, 162 N.E. 115 (1928) (ordinance regulating and licensing beauty parlors found invalid);
Wilke v. City of Chicago, 188 Ill. 444, 58 N.E. 1004 (1900) (ordinance imposing an additional
license fee on plumbers held invalid). Since the adoption of the 1970 constitution, however,
Illinois home rule units have possessed significantly broader powers than did municipalities
prior to its adoption. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
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a matter of statewide concern.'4 Hence, the Quilici majority would have
been correct to have held that the handgun ban is within the scope of Mor-
ton Grove's local affairs.
Contrary to the dissent's assertion, the Quilici court would have been
similarly accurate in finding Morton Grove's ordinance valid despite the fact
that it actually prohibits what the state statutes merely regulate. The Illinois
Supreme Court has held consistently that ordinances enacted pursuant to
a municipality's home rule authority can supersede related state legislation,'"4
147. Nevertheless, the Quilici dissent concluded that handgun control is exclusively a matter
of statewide concern and, therefore, beyond Morton Grove's home rule authority. Judge Cof-
fey's dissent principally relied upon Ampersand, Inc. v. Finley, 61 111. 2d 537, 338 N.E.2d
15 (1975), and City of Des Plaines v. Chicago & N.W.R.R., 65 Il1. 2d 1, 357 N.E.2d 433
(1976). Because the ordinances in Ampersand and City of Des Plaines are distinguishable from
Morton Grove's handgun ban, the dissent's reliance on these cases is anomolous.
The ordinances in Ampersand and City of Des Plaines attempted to regulate areas which
require a unified system of statewide regulation. In Ampersand, the Illinois Supreme Court
held an ordinance imposing a litigation filing fee to be an invalid exercise of home rule authority.
Ampersand, 61 111. 2d at 542, 338 N.E.2d at 18-19. As noted by the Illinois Supreme Court,
the Illinois Constitution contemplates only one unified judicial system operating statewide. Town
of Cicero v. Fox Valley Trotting Club, 65 II. 2d 10, 21, 357 N.E.2d 1118, 1122 (1976) (dic-
tum). Since local regulation would subvert this constitutional objective, the administration of
justice is exclusively a matter of statewide concern. Municipal handgun bans, however, subvert
no similar constitutional objective. It is, therefore, illogical to suggest that the constitution intended
only one unified system of firearms regulation.
In City of Des Plaines, the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated an ordinance designed to regulate
noise pollution originating within or outside the municipality. City of Des Plaines, 65 IIl. 2d
at 5, 357 N.E.2d at 435-36. The City of Des Plaines court noted that the Illinois Environmen-
tal Protection Act states as its purpose the establishment of "a unified statewide program."
Id. at 7, 357 N.E.2d at 436. Furthermore, the Illinois Supreme Court has consistently held
that regulation of regional environmental problems is beyond the authority of home rule units.
See, e.g., Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. v. City of Des Plaines, 63 Ill. 2d 256, 347 N.E.2d 716
(1976) (home rule ordinance regulating regional sewage treatment plant did not pertain to
municipality's local affairs). The area of handgun control, unlike the area of environmental
control, has not been recognized by either the Illinois courts or legislature as demanding a unified
system of statewide regulation. Moreover, the constitutional history of § 22 indicates that the
framers contemplated the existence of municipal handgun bans. See 3 PROCEEDINGS 1687, 1689,
1718; see also supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
148. Prior to the effective date of the 1970 constitution, the Illinois Supreme Court adhered
to the principle that an ordinance is invalid if it prohibits what a statute expressly permits.
See, e.g., Arrington v. City of Chicago, 45 I11. 2d 316, 259 N.E.2d 22 (1970) (declaring a
municipal ordinance regulating the carrying of firearms invalid to the extent that it conflicted
with statutes). Since the adoption of the 1970 constitution, however, the Illinois Supreme Court
has uniformly rejected this principle and upheld ordinances actually conflicting with statutes.
See City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 85 Ill. 2d 101, 421 N.E.2d 196 (1981) (upholding a landlord-
tenant ordinance); Mulligan v. Dunne, 61 111. 2d 544, 338 N.E.2d 6 (1975) (upholding a Cook
County liquor tax); Paglini v. Police Bd., 61 111. 2d 233, 335 N.E.2d 480 (11975) (upholding a
personnel ordinance); Peters v. City of Springfield, 57 Ill. 2d 142, 311 N.E.2d 107 (1974) (same);
Clarke v. Village of Arlington Heights, 57 Il. 2d 50, 309 N.E.2d 576 (1974) (upholding a govern-
mental reorganization ordinance); People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Beck, 54 111. 2d 561, 301 N.E.2d
281 (1973) (same). More recently, the Illinois appellate courts have steadfastly recognized the
ability of municipal ordinances to supersede conflicting state statutes. See Resman v. Personnel
Bd., 96 Ill. App. 3d 919, 422 N.E.2d 120 (lst Dist. 1981) (upholding a personnel ordinance);
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even if an extensive scheme of statutory regulation exists."4 9 For example,
in Mulligan v. Dunne,' ° the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the Cook
County liquor tax as a valid exercise of home rule authority, despite the exis-
tence of extensive state regulation of liquor which did not tax its sale. The
Mulligan court recognized that when an ordinance enacted pursuant to home
rule authority conflicts with a state statute, the ordinance will prevail unless the
statute specifically limits home rule powers and was enacted subsequent to
the adoption of the 1970 Illinois Constitution.' The Mulligan court con-
cluded that because the Illinois General Assembly had failed to enact legisla-
tion specifically restricting the power of home rule units to tax liquor, the
ordinance did not exceed Cook County's home rule authority.'5 2
Therefore, Morton Grove's handgun ban prevails over conflicting state
statutes regulating firearms, unless such statutes were enacted or amended
subsequent to the adoption of the 1970 Illinois Constitution and specifically
limit home rule powers. Although several sections of the Illinois Criminal
Code regulate handgun possession,'" they were enacted prior to the adop-
tion of the 1970 constitution.' 5' Furthermore, despite various amendments
enacted subsequent to 1970, none of these provisions directly purports to
restrict home rule powers."' Consequently, the mere non-concurrence of the
handgun ban with the related statutory scheme does not invalidate Morton
Grove's ordinance.' 56
Hoffman v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 86 Ill. App. 3d 505, 408 N.E.2d 98 (3d Dist.
1980) (same); City of Springfield v. Ushman, 71 111. App. 3d 112, 388 N.E.2d 1357 (4th Dist.
1979) (upholding an ordinance taxing the sale of fireworks); Scott v. Rochford, 66 Ill. App.
3d 338, 384 N.E.2d 19 (1st Dist. 1978) (upholding a personnel ordinance), aff'd, 77 111. 2d 507,
397 N.E.2d 801 (1979); Landry v. Smith, 66 Il1. App. 3d 616, 384 N.E.2d 430 (1st Dist. 1978)
(upholding a landlord-tenant ordinance); see also COLE, supra note 139, at 5.
149. Mulligan v. Dunne, 61 Ill. 2d 544, 549, 338 N.E.2d 6, 10 (1975) (extensive state statutory
scheme evidenced by Dram Shop Act).
150. Id.
151. The Mulligan court stated:
We have held on several occasions that even an exercise of a home rule power
under section 6(a) which actually conflicts with a statute enacted prior to the adop-
tion of the 1970 Constitution is nonetheless valid unless the power is restricted by
a constitutional provision or appropriate legislation enacted subsequent to the 1970
Constitution .... Moreover, we have held that even if enacted subsequent to the
Constitution, a statute which purports to restrict home rule powers must be
specific . ..
Id. at 549, 338 N.E.2d at 10-11.
152. Id. at 550, 338 N.E.2d at 11.
153. See ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 24-3.1 (prohibiting only certain classes of persons from
possessing firearms), 24-1(a)(10) (prohibiting handgun possession by a person on a public street,
alley or public lands), 24-1(a)(4) (prohibiting the carrying of certain handguns), 24-1(a)(8) (pro-
hibiting firearm possession in establishments licensed to sell alcoholic beverages), 24-1(a)(7) (pro-
hibiting the possession of certain types of firearms), 83-13.13 (authorizing municipalities to
impose greater restrictions or limitations on firearms possession) (1982).
154. Most of chapter 38 was adopted as the criminal code of 1961.
155. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 24-1, 24-3.1, 83-13.1 (Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp. 1982).
156. Nevertheless, the Quilici dissent contends that by prohibiting what numerous sections
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Similarly, the Quilici majority would have been correct to hold that Mor-
ton Grove's handgun ban is not preempted by existing statutory regulations.
Since the adoption of the Illinois Constitution in 1970, the Illinois Supreme
Court has uniformly rejected any notion of implied preemption. '57 Instead,
the court requires preemptive legislation to contain explicit statements reflec-
ting a clear intent to preempt home rule powers.' 8 A careful examination
of existing state firearm regulations discloses no express statements of preemp-
of the Illinois Criminal Code merely regulate, Morton Grove's handgun ban is invalid because
it is not concurrent with related state legislation. Quilici, 695 F.2d at 277-78 (Coffey, J., dis-
senting). This contention fails to consider that under the Mulligan standard, none of these
statutes precludes a home rule unit from enacting ordinances which conflict with the statutes.
See supra notes 151, 153-55 and accompanying text. Hence, though it prohibits what related
state legislation merely regulates, Morton Grove's handgun ban is, nonetheless, a valid exercise
of its home rule authority.
157. Furthermore, prior to 1970, the Illinois Supreme Court expressly held that existing state
legislation did not preempt the field of local gun control. Brown v. City of Chicago, 47 Il.
2d 501, 504, 250 N.E.2d 129, 131 (1969).
158. The seminal case in the area of Illinois home rule preemption is Rozner v. Korshak,
55 111. 2d 430, 303 N.E.2d 389 (1973). In Rozner, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a Chicago
wheel tax as a constitutional exercise of Chicago's home rule authority. Id. at 435, 303 N.E.2d
at 391. The Rozner court noted that inadvertent restriction of home rule authority could be
avoided if "statutes that are intended to limit or deny home rule powers contain an express
statement to that effect." Id. Finding no express statutory statement indicating a restrictive
purpose, the Rozner court held the relevant statute to have no restrictive effect on home rule
powers. Id.
More recently, in City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 85 Il1. 2d 101, 421 N.E.2d 196 (1981),
the Illinois Supreme Court adhered to the express statement requirement announced in Rozner.
In upholding an ordinance regulating landlord-tenant relations, the Create court noted that
absent an explicit statutory statement restricting home rule authority, the powers of a home
rule unit are not preempted. The Create court stated:
The enactment of a statute after the date of the 1970 constitution does not
automatically render the area one of exclusive control by the State under section
6(h) or deny home rule units the power to act under 6(g). The statute must contain
an express statement to that effect. In the absence of such express legislation . . .
"[hiome rule units may exercise and perform concurrently with the State any power
or function of a home rule unit .. "
Id. at 108, 421 N.E.2d at 199 (emphasis added & citations omitted).
Accordingly, the Illinois Supreme Court has found home rule authority preempted only when
the preemptive legislation contained explicit statements reflecting a clear intent to preempt home
rule powers. For example, in 1977 the Illinois Supreme Court found that state regulation of
real estate brokers had preempted local control in that area. See Andruss v. City of Evanston,
68 Ill. 2d 215, 369 N.E.2d 1258 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978). The Andruss court
found the following statutory language sufficient to express preemptive intent:
It is declared to be the public policy of this State, pursuant to paragraphs (h) and
(i) of Section 6 of Art. VII of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, that any power
or function set forth in this Act to be exercised by the State is an exclusive State
power or function. Such power or function shall not be exercised concurrently,
either directly or indirectly, by any unit of local government, including home rule
units, except as otherwise provided in this Act.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 114 , § 124 (1975). For additional examples of sufficiently expressed
preemptive intent, see Prudential Ins. Co. v. Chicago, 66 Ill. 2d 437, 362 N.E.2d 1021 (1977)
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tive intent.' 59 Hence, the Illinois General Assembly has not preempted home
rule units from enacting gun control ordinances and, therefore, Morton
Grove's handgun ban is a valid exercise of its home rule authority.'60
(insurance company regulation), and United Private Detective & Sec. Ass'n v. Chicago, 62
Ill. 2d 506, 343 N.E.2d 453 (1976) (regulation of private detectives).
159. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text. The closest any of these criminal code
sections comes to expressing preemptive intent is the Deadly Weapons Act provision authoriz-
ing municipalities to enact greater restrictions or limitations on firearm possesion. See ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 83-13.1 (1982). It is conceivable that, in some jurisdictions, this proviso would
imply that municipal firearm regulation is limited to restrictions and limitations; therefore,
municipal prohibitions would be invalid. In Illinois, however, when considering the statutory
language present in Andruss, it becomes difficult to contend that the Deadly Weapons Act
sufficiently expresses preemptive intent. Thus, under the Rozner line of decisions, it fails to
preclude Morton Grove from banning handguns.
160. Nevertheless, the Quilici dissent concluded that through extensive and long-standing
firearms regulation, the Illinois General Assembly had implicitly preempted the field of hand-
gun possession. Quilici, 695 F.2d at 272-75 (Coffey, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Judge Cof-
fey relied primarily on Ampersand, Inc. v. Finley, 61 Ill. 2d 537, 338 N.E.2d 15 (1975), and
Hutchcraft Van Serv. v. City of Urbana, 104 Ill. App. 3d 817, 433 N.E.2d 329 (4th Dist.
1982), to contend that various sections of the Illinois Criminal Code implicitly preempt Morton
Grove's handgun ban. Reliance on Ampersand and Hutchcraft, however, is misplaced and fails
to consider the overwhelming majority of Illinois Supreme Court decisions rejecting any notion
of implied preemption. See, e.g., City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 85 Il1. 2d 101, 421 N.E.2d
196 (1981) (ordinance regulating landlord-tenant relations held not preempted by existing statutory
regulation); City of Urbana v. Houser, 67 Ill. 2d 268, 367 N.E.2d 692 (1977) (finding an amen-
datory act not intended to limit home rule authority); Town of Cicero v. Fox Valley Trotting
Club, 65 Ill. 2d 10, 357 N.E.2d 1118 (1976) (despite comprehensive statutory regulation, home
rule units are not preempted from taxing horse racing); Stryker v. Village of Oak Park, 62
Ill. 2d 523, 343 N.E.2d 919 (holding that the Illinois Municipal Code does not preempt home
rule unit ordinances altering their governmental structure), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 832 (1976);
City of Chicago v. Pollution Control Bd., 59 Ill. 2d 484, 322 N.E.2d 11 (1974) (failure of En-
vironmental Protection Act to express exclusivity permits home rule units to regulate environmental
control); Rozner v. Korshak, 55 I1. 2d 430, 303 N.E.2d 389 (1973) (municipal wheel tax held
not preempted).
The Ampersand court noted two examples of implied preemption; both were contained within
the majority report of the Illinois constitutional convention's Local Government Committee.
Ampersand, 61 Ill. 2d at 540-41, 338 N.E.2d at 17-18. This report declared that ordinances
enacted under home rule authority, which regulate interest rates on loans, would be invalid
due to extensive federal and state regulation of credit institutions. 7 PROCEEDINGS 1652. The
report similarly declared that long-standing state regulation of utility rates precludes home rule
units from regulating local telephone call rates. Id. These examples of implied preemption are
extremely limited. A gun control ordinance enacted by a home rule unit is fundamentally dif-
ferent from both an ordinance limiting the rates that may be charged for local telephone calls,
and an ordinance limiting the rates of interest that may be charged on loans. Unlike the regula-
tion of interest rates and local telephone call rates, the regulation of firearms has traditionally
been recognized to fall within the ambit of municipal police powers. See Brown v. City of
Chicago, 47 Ill. 2d 501, 250 N.E.2d 120 (1969) (upholding gun control ordinance); Biffer v.
City of Chicago, 278 I1. 562, 116 N.E. 182 (1917) (same). Moreover, the constitutional history
of the home rule provisions expressly indicates that the framers did not intend to allow
municipalities to enact ordinances regulating interest rates or local telephone call rates. See
7 PROCEEDINGS 1652. By contrast, the constitutional history of § 22 demonstrates that the framers
intended to permit municipalities to enact handgun bans. See 3 id. at 1687, 1689, 1718; see
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The Ninth Amendment
The Quilici majority properly rejected the contention that the ninth amend-
ment guarantees a right to possess handguns, but it did so for the wrong
reason. The court found that no such right exists, essentially because its
existence has never been recognized by the United States Supreme Court.'"
A sufficient analysis of whether a constitutional right exists, however, re-
quires more than a mere observation of the Supreme Court's failure to
recognize the alleged right. Were it otherwise, the existence of countless con-
stitutional rights would never have been determined.' 62 The consequence of
such an approach is exemplified by the scarcity of Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the second amendment right to bear arms. Lower federal courts
have both the authority and the duty to decide whether an alleged constitu-
tional right exists when the Supreme Court has failed to consider its
existence.' 63 Accordingly, the Quilici majority should have examined more
carefully whether the ninth amendment guarantees a fundamental right to
possess handguns for purposes of self-defense.
Although a majority of the Court has never enunciated a standard to deter-
mine the scope of the ninth amendment, Justice Goldberg, in his concurring
opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut,'4 outlined the following approach to
also supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text. Consequently, the examples of implied preemption
noted in Ampersand are inapplicable to the facts presented in Quilici.
In Hutchcraft, an Illinois appellate court concluded that the Illinois Human Rights Act im-
plicitly preempted Urbana from enacting an ordinance prohibiting discrimination. Hutchcraft,
104 Ill. App. 3d at 824, 433 N.E.2d at 334. Relying on a decision rendered by a California
appellate court, the Hutchcraft court concluded that exclusivity could be revealed in ways other
than by expressed preemption. Id. at 823, 433 N.E.2d at 333 (a legislative regulatory scheme
implicitly preempts local control over the regulated subject) (citing Alta-Dena Dairy v. County
of San Diego, 271 Cal. App. 2d 66, 75, 76 Cal. Rptr. 510, 516 (1969)). This conclusion may
be valid under California home rule authority. See, e.g., In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 372 P.2d
897, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1962) (city ordinance prohibiting sexual intercourse between persons
not married to each other held to be preempted by state legislation); Doe v. City of San Fran-
cisco, 136 Cal. App. 3d 509, 186 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1982) (ordinance banning handguns declared
to be implicitly preempted by existing state statutes). In Illinois, however, this conclusion can-
not be reconciled with the overwhelming majority of Illinois Supreme Court decisions rejecting
any notion of implied preemption of home rule authority.
161. 695 F.2d at 271.
162. For example, prior to 1973, the Supreme Court had never recognized a constitutionally
protected right to an abortion. Nevertheless, in 1970, a lower federal court declared that the
ninth amendment protects a woman's right to decide whether to have children. Roe v. Wade,
314 F. Supp. 1217, 1221-22 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (invalidating a Texas statute prohibiting abor-
tion), aff'd, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
163. See generally S. EARLY, JR., CoNrSITuTIoNAL CoURTs OF THE U.S. 5-7, 105-10 (1977);
Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review
and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 551-54 (1969). See also Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). The Marbury Court declared that "[it is emphatically the
province and the duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply
the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule." Id.
164. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (statute forbidding the use of contraceptives unconstitutionally in-
fringes the right of marital privacy).
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determine which rights are fundamental and, therefore, within the protec-
tion of the ninth amendment:
[L]ook to the "traditions and (collective) conscience of our people" to
determine whether a principle is "so rooted (there) ...as to be ranked
as fundamental." . . . The inquiry is whether a right involved "is of such
a character that it cannot be denied without violating those 'fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and
political institutions'...."I"
According to this approach, the right to possess handguns for purposes of
self-defense will emerge as fundamental only if it cannot be denied without
violating fundamental principles of liberty and justice. A Supreme Court
decision, Katz v. United States,"' recognizes that this right can be denied
without violating such principles.
In Katz, the Court held that electronically recording conversations over
a public telephone amounts to a search and seizure violating the speaker's
privacy rights. The Katz Court noted that the protection of one's general
privacy right, the right to be free from interference by others, is "like the
protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of
the individual States."' 67 Based upon this language, it appears that the right
of self-defense is not fundamental. Instead, Katz allows state law to deter-
mine the right of individuals to protect themselves and their property. If
this right were fundamental, it is doubtful that the Court would have left
it to be protected solely by state law; rather, the Court would have recognized
it to be protected by the Constitution. Consequently, it would be inaccurate
to characterize the right of self-defense and its ancillary right to possess hand-
guns as fundamental. As judged by Justice Goldberg's standard, therefore,
the Quilici majority correctly concluded that these rights do not receive ninth
amendment protection.' 68
165. Id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citations omitted). It is critical to note that Justice
Goldberg's approach has never been adopted by a majority of the Court. Quilici, 532 F. Supp.
at 1183. Nevertheless, it exists as the only explicit discussion of an approach to determine the
ninth amendment's reach in any Supreme Court decision. Id. Furthermore, it has been applied
in at least one lower court decision. See Petrey v. Flaughner, 505 F. Supp. 1087, 1090 (E.D.
Ky. 1981) (expulsion of student not violative of ninth amendment).
166. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
167. Id. at 350 (emphasis added); see also Navarra v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields Inc., 510
F. Supp. 831, 835 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (relying on Katz to uphold a state wiretapping statute).
168. Nevertheless, the Quilici dissent concluded that private handgun possession is protected
by the ninth amendment. 695 F.2d at 278-80 (Coffey, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Judge
Coffey contended that by prohibiting the possession of handguns within the confines of the
home, Morton Grove's ordinance impermissibly violates two fundamental rights: "the fundamental
right to privacy and the fundamental right to defend the home against unlawful intrusion within
the parameters of the criminal law." Id. at 279. A careful examination of these rights reveals
that Judge Coffey's contention is apparently mistaken.
In analyzing the existence of the right to privacy, the Supreme Court has held that although
it is not explicitly guaranteed within the Constitution, the right to privacy is accorded constitu-
tional protection because it is indispensable to the enjoyment of those rights expressly granted.
See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (absent an over-
riding interest, a criminal trial must be open to the public). The Court further held that "only
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BEYOND QUILICl
Since the Quilici decision was based on both state and federal constitu-
tional grounds, its impact on future gun control cases must be determined
through a bifurcated analysis. The Quilici court's conclusion that article I,
section 22 of the Illinois Constitution only prohibits a total ban of all
firearms, and therefore, permits bans on certain types of guns, is binding
precedent on Illinois federal courts-unless the Illinois Supreme Court subse-
quently interprets section 22 differently.' 69 Thus, federal district courts in
Illinois are now precluded from invalidating handgun prohibitions alleged
to violate the state constitutional right to bear arms. Yet, because Seventh
Circuit constructions of state constitutional provisions are not binding on
Illinois state courts, these courts remain free to interpret section 22 as pro-
hibiting handgun bans. "' Nevertheless, the Quilici court's declaration that
personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'
.. . are included in this guarantee of personal privacy." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152
(1973) (statutes prohibiting abortion declared unconstitutional). Although the outer limits of this
right remain uncertain, the Court has indicated that its scope includes matters "relating to mar-
riage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education." Carey
v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (declaring unconstitutional a statute pro-
hibiting distribution of non-medical contraceptives to persons over the age of 16, except through
a licensed pharmacist) (citations omitted) (citing Roe v. Wade with approval). Nevertheless, relying
principally upon Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), the Quilici dissent contends that the
right to privacy of the home is fundamental and, therefore, within the protection of the ninth
amendment.
The Stanley Court held that the first and fourteenth amendments prohibit states from criminaliz-
ing the private possession of obscene material in the confines of one's own home. Id. at 568.
Although this holding may be read as recognizing a fundamental right of privacy in the home,
the Stanley Court expressly limited this right by stating:
What we have said in no way infringes upon the power of the state or Federal
Government to make possession of other items, such as narcotics, firearms, or stolen
goods, a crime. Our holding in the present case turns upon the Georgia statute's
infringement of fundamental liberties protected by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment. No First Amendment fights are involved in most statutes making mere posses-
sion criminal.
Id. at 568 n.11 (emphasis added). Consequently, Stanley offers little support for the contention
that private handgun possession is protected by the fundamental ight to privacy in the home.
Unlike the right to privacy, the right to defend one's home has yet to be recognized by
the Supreme Court as a fundamental right protected by the ninth amendment. Furthermore,
based upon Katz it appears that the right to defend one's home is not a fundamental right.
See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text. Consequently, Judge Coffey's contention that
the ninth amendment protects the right to defend one's home seems to be mistaken.
169. See Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 228 (2d Cir. 1980) (judgments of courts
of appeals are binding on federal district courts within their circuit unless overruled by the
Supreme Court); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 970 (3d Cir. 1979) (same).
170. See, e.g., Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, 638 F.2d 916, 926 (6th
Cir. 1980) (a federal court's interpretation of state law is not binding on state courts), vacated
on other grounds, 451 U.S. 1013 (1981); United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d
1072, 1076 (7th Cir. 1970) (a state court is not required to follow, as precedent, a decision
of a lower federal court invalidating a city ordinance), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971); State
v. Young, 62 Ohio St. 2d 370, 375 n.2, 406 N.E.2d 499, 503 n.2 (1980) (noting that a federal
court's interpretation of state law is persuasive but not binding upon state courts).
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the second amendment to the United States Constitution does not prohibit
handgun bans is binding precedent on all federal district courts within the
Seventh Circuit."' Additionally, this declaration is persuasive authority not
only for Illinois state courts, but for other courts as well.' 2
More significant than its judicial impact, however, is the effect that the
Quilici decision might have on future gun control efforts. Morton Grove
was the first American community to challenge the second amendment by
171. Cf. Owsley v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 804, 805 (4th Cir. 1965) (state courts are not obligated
to follow decisions by federal courts of appeal); Corbett v. Devon Bank, 12 Ill. App. 3d 559,
567, 299 N.E.2d 521, 525 (1st Dist. 1973) (the only federal decisions binding on Illinois state
courts are those rendered by the United States Supreme Court). But cf. Hannigan v. Elgin,
J. & E. Ry. Co., 337 I1. App. 538, 548, 86 N.E.2d 388, 392 (1st Dist. 1949) (federal courts
of appeal interpretations of federal statutes are binding on state courts).
172. The impact that the Quilici decision will have on state or local handgun bans enacted
outside Illinois is difficult to determine. Courts are not bound to adhere to decisions reached
in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Occhino v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n, 28 Il1. App. 3d
967, 971-72, 329 N.E.2d 353, 356-57 (1st Dist. 1975) (Illinois courts are not bound to follow
decisions of courts in other states). Furthermore, though the majority of state constitutions
include provisions protecting the right to bear arms, many of them are fundamentally different
from § 22. See Comment, State Constitutional Right to Bear Arms, supra note 133; see also
supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text. In those jurisdictions which either lack a constitu-
tional arms provision, or have a constitutional right to bear arms provision sufficiently similar
to § 22, the Quilici decision should carry considerable persuasive authority. Nevertheless, in
those jurisdictions where the state right to bear arms differs fundamentally from § 22, it is
unlikely that much weight will be attached to Quilici in determining the validity of state and
local handgun bans.
Some authorities, however, contend that qualifying clauses which subject the right to bear
arms to the police power, are merely "manifestations of superabundant causation." Haile v.
State, 38 Ark. 564, 567 (1882); Comment, State Constitutional Right to Bear Arms, supra
note 133, at 189. According to this view, all state constitutional arms provisions implicitly preserve
the police power to regulate firearms. Id. at 188-89. If this contention is accepted, the Quilici
decision will have a universally persuasive impact.
Similarly, it appears that Illinois home rule units have broader authority than do their counter-
parts in other states. See Parkhurst, supra note 141, at 22. Most other home rule units have
the power to regulate, but not to prohibit activities. See MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 10.26 (3d
ed. 1979). But see City of Junction City v. Lee, 216 Kan. 495, 532 P.2d 1292 (1975) (upholding
home rule prohibition of carrying concealed handguns). Furthermore, in most jurisdictions,
a home rule unit's ordinance is void if it conflicts with a state statute. See supra MCQUILLIN
MUN. CORP. § 4.107; see also City of Canton v. Whitman, 44 Ohio St. 2d 62, 66, 337 N.E.2d
766, 770 (1975); City of Chickasha v. Arkansas La. Gas, 625 P.2d 638, 640-41 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1981). Also, in most jurisdictions, unlike in Illinois, home rule authority can be implicity
preempted by the enactment of state statutes. See supra MCQUIUIN MUN. CORP. § 4.87; see
also In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 372 P.2d 897, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1962) (state legislation im-
plicitly preempted a municipal ordinance prohibiting sexual intercourse between persons not
married to each other); Doe v. City of San Francisco, 136 Cal. App. 3d 509, 186 Cal. Rptr.
380 (1982) (state statutes implicitly preempted a city ordinance banning handguns); City of
Joplin v. Industrial Comm'n, 329 S.W.2d 687 (Mo. 1959) (state prevailing wage act implicitly
preempted a municipal charter provision); Nagle v. City of Grand Island, 144 Neb. 67, 12 N.W.2d
540 (1943) (state eminent domain statute implicitly preempted home rule enactments). Therefore,
although Quilici may support handgun prohibition enacted by state legislatures outside Illinois,
it is doubtful that it will offer much support to handgun bans adopted by home rule municipalities
of other states.
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prohibiting handgun possession. Amidst renewed interest in handgun con-
trol, stemming principally from the assassination attempt on President Ronald
Reagan and the senseless shooting of John Lennon, the Quilici decision
breathes new life into oft-forgotten second amendment doctrines. The Quilici
decision destroys several fictions created and perpetuated by the pro-gun lobby
by reminding state and local legislators that the second amendment poses
no obstacle to their gun control efforts. More importantly, Quilici reminds
members of Congress that, despite pro-gun lobbyists' assertions to the con-
trary,'73 the second amendment right to bear arms is a collective right aimed
solely at the preservation of well-regulated state militias. By dismantling the
fiction that the second amendment protects an individual right to possess
handguns, Quilici lays the foundation for far-reaching congressional gun con-
trol. Ultimately, Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove might very well provide
Congress with the additional firepower necessary to secure a national hand-
gun ban.
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit reached the appropriate decision by upholding this
nation's first municipal ordinance banning the possession of handguns in
Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove. The Quilici court correctly determined
that the second amendment applies solely to the federal government and
protects only a collective right to bear arms and that such right is inex-
tricably related to the maintenance of a well-regulated militia. Furthermore,
the court properly found that article I, section 22 of the Illinois Constitu-
tion presents no obstacle to the enactment of handgun bans. Nevertheless,
despite its accurate analysis of issues, the majority failed to devote adequate
attention to considerations of home rule authority and to the existence of
fundamental rights protected by the ninth amendment. Hence, the Quilici
majority should be applauded for reaching the correct decision, but can be
criticized for failing to carefully examine issues central to determining the
validity of Morton Grove's handgun ban.
Howard L Bass
173. See generally J. WHISKER, OUR VANISHING FREEDOM passim (2d ed. 1974) (asserting
that the Constitution secures an individual right to bear arms).

